

SPREAD POSITIVITY




NOT THE VIRUS.

Covid-19 & Aerosol / Airborne



About you

- Event & logistics managers
- Registered nurses
- Emergency medical technicians
- Health & safety advisors & consultants
- Emergency planners & risk managers
- Decision-makers (HCFRN, municipality, province, school, police, 112, entreprise network, ...)



Let's interact through the chat!

After 3 pm we can talk, or organize smaller groups later



About me

Christophe Cloquet, 40
Founder of Poppy since 2014

*A sharp **technical** background
backed by a solid **field** experience*

4 years with the Belgian Defence
20 years as a volunteer Emergency Medical Technician

MSc in Applied Physics (2002)
PhD in Applied Sciences (medical imaging, 2011)
Post-doc in Data Science

Certifications

ISO 27001:2013 Foundations
GDPR Foundations
ITIL 4 Foundations
HAREC

Customers: Brussels 112 & Fire Brigade, National Crisis Centre,
Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, SPF Interior,
SPF Public Health, Red-Cross, ...

- ⇒ No MD – virologist - epidemiologist
- ⇒ No psychologist
- ⇒ No lawyer
- ⇒ No decision-maker
- ⇒ No guru
- ⇒ Believe of a pluridisciplinary approach



UCLouvain






Goals

- Give each of you at least **one useful new piece of information**
- **Global overview & references** to go further by yourself
- Present myself should you want to **collaborate**

Your goals

- You want **your collaborators to air more**
 - Buy a CO₂ sensor (200 €)
- You want to **quickly assess the risk & airing in your facilities**
 - Use & understand the risk calculators
 - Buy a bunch of CO₂ sensors + fans & follow the Harvard guide
- You **cannot air more**
 - Properly install (true & well-dimensioned) HEPA-filters
- You have a **broader view**
 - Get inspiration about why/what/how can be done
- Your **issue is complex**
 - Hire me as a consultant!





Sciensano (24/12/2020)

→ “In the absence of any ventilation, according to a study, SARS-CoV-2 remains viable in aerosols for 3 hours, with median half-life 1.1-1.2 hours”

→ “The potential of long-range airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is no longer disputed, although its relative importance remains unclear”


Some other references

Vuorinen et al (2020), *Modelling aerosol transport and virus exposure with numerical simulations in relation to SARS-CoV-2 transmission by inhalation indoors*, Safety Science

Tang et al (2020) *Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2? Evidence, prevention and control*, Environ Int

Tang et al (2020), *Dismantling myths on the airborne transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)*, Journal of Hospital Infection

Examples




High SARS-CoV-2 Attack Rate Following Exposure at a Choir Practice — Skagit County, Washington, March 2020

Weekly / May 15, 2020 / 69(19);606–610

On May 12, 2020, this report was posted online as an MMWR Early Release.

Lea Hamner, MPH¹; Polly Dubbel, MPH¹; Ian Capron¹; Andy Ross, MPH¹; Amber Jordan, MPH¹; Jaxon Lee, MPH¹; Joanne Lynn¹; Amelia Ball¹; Simranjit Narwal, MSc¹; Sam Russell¹; Dale Patrick¹; Howard Leibrand, MD¹ ([View author affiliations](#))



Evidence for probable aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant


[Comments \(1\)](#)

Yuguo Li, Hua Qian, Jian Hang, Xuguang Chen, Ling Hong, Peng Liang, Jiansen Li, Shenglan Xiao, Jianjian Wei, Li Liu, Min Kang

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.16.20067728>

Sars-Cov-2 Transmission routes

Figure 1 – Modélisation des voies de transmission « Air », « Gouttelettes » et « Contact », d'après Otter et al. 2016.



* Transmission routes involving a combination of hand & surface = indirect contact.

Why (also) tackle this problem on the long term ?



- ⇒ Respect the law (indoor air – max 900 ppm CO₂)
- ⇒ Variants / endemic Covid-19
- ⇒ Influenza (evitable ICU & deaths)
- ⇒ Increasing tuberculosis / measles
- ⇒ Prepare other pandemics

Risk calculators

Wells-Riley relates airing to infection probability:

(base for the Max Planck Institute, UColorado & REHVA models)

Probability of being infected =



with

I = # of carriers
 p = breathing rate
 q = quantas rate
 Δt = time
 Q = airing rate [ACH]

1 quantum = dose of airborne particles to cause infection with 63 % of susceptible persons

Hypotheses

- « Perfect mixing », Volume < 300 m³
- Uncertainty on quantas + cf variant (but scenarios)

Result

- Average, but **no information on the variability**
- Does not tell what is the **acceptable probability** (to be drawn from **epidemiological** models & other hypotheses - Buonanno et al suggest 1/1000 as a discussion base)

Calculator 1: Max Planck Institute



International Journal of
*Environmental Research
and Public Health*



Article

Model Calculations of Aerosol Transmission and Infection Risk of COVID-19 in Indoor Environments

Jos Lelieveld ^{1,2,*}, Frank Helleis ¹, Stephan Borrmann ¹, Yafang Cheng ¹, Frank Drewnick ¹, Gerald Haug ¹, Thomas Klimach ¹, Jean Sciare ², Hang Su ¹ and Ulrich Pöschl ¹

¹ Max Planck Institute for Chemistry, 55128 Mainz, Germany; frank.helleis@mpic.de (F.H.); stephan.borrmann@mpic.de (S.B.); yafang.cheng@mpic.de (Y.C.); frank.drewnick@mpic.de (F.D.); gerald.haug@mpic.de (G.H.); t.klimach@mpic.de (T.K.); h.su@mpic.de (H.S.); u.poschl@mpic.de (U.P.)
² The Cyprus Institute, Climate and Atmosphere Research Center, 2121 Nicosia, Cyprus; j.sciare@cyi.ac.cy
 * Correspondence: jos.lelieveld@mpic.de

Received: 18 October 2020; Accepted: 31 October 2020; Published: 3 November 2020



check for updates

mpic.de/4747361/risk-calculator?en

Outputs

- Individual probability of acquiring the virus if there is one person infected at the event
- Probability at least one person would become infected



- ⇒ Gives an order of magnitude (0,1 - 1 - 10 - 50 - 100 %)
- ⇒ Compares between scenarios

Aerosol transmission of COVID-19 and infection risk in indoor environments

The calculations for estimating infection risks are based on assumptions and formulas from the article "Aerosol transmission of COVID-19 and infection risk in indoor environments" by Lelieveld et al. 2020. (<https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17218114>)

Examples click to fill in:

- [classroom](#)
- [Office](#)
- [reception](#)
- [choir rehearsal](#)
- [Supermarket](#)

Properties of the infectious Person

Speaking volume [1=quietly, 3=loud, 4.9= singing/screaming]	2
mask efficiency (exhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.7, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.5]	0
fraction of speaking [0-100%]	10
respiratory rate [l/min] [7.5-15; adult=10]	10

Room Properties

air exchange rate [1/h] [0.35=no ventilation, 2=rapid ventilation once per h, 6=public places/supermarket]	0.35
floor size [m²]	60
height [m]	3

Event details

duration [h]	12
mask efficiency (inhalation) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.5, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.2]	0
People in Room	24

> Aerosol Properties (for experts)

> Virus Properties (for experts)

9.9% individual infection risk if one person is infectious.

91% probability that at least one other person gets infected if one person is infectious at the event.

Aerosol transmission of COVID-19 and infection risk in indoor environments

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Examples click to fill in:

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- [Office](#)
- [reception](#)
- [choir rehearsal](#)
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Properties of the infectious Person

Speaking volume [1=quietly, 3=loud, 4..9= singing/screaming]	2
mask efficiency (exhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.7, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.5]	0
fraction of speaking [0-100%]	10
respiratory rate [l/min] [7.5-15; adult=10]	10

Room Properties

air exchange rate [1/h] [0.35=no ventilation, 2=rapid ventilation once per h, 6=public places/supermarket]	0.35
floor size [m²]	60
height [m]	3

Event details

duration [h]	12
mask efficiency (inhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.5, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.2]	0
People in Room	24

> Aerosol Properties (for experts)

> Virus Properties (for experts)

9.9% individual infection risk if one person is infectious.

91% probability that at least one other person gets infected if one person is infectious at the event.

Aerosol Properties (for experts)

effective Mean diameter [µm]	5
concentration breath [#/ccm]	0,06
concentration speak [#/ccm]	0,6
deposition efficiency lung	0,5

Virus Properties (for experts)

Dosis at 50% infection prob [100-1000]	316
RNA conc in liquid [copies/ml] [1e8-1e11]	5e+8

The reported viral RNA concentration of approximately 5×10^8 /ml represents the category of highly infectious patients and represents approximately 20% of individuals tested positive for SARS-CoV-2


lifetime in air [h]

5e+9 for super-spreaders (5%)
8.5e+8 for variant

Calculator 2: University of Colorado

Pressure	0.95 atm	Used only for CO2 calculation
Temperature	20 C	Use web converter if needed for F → C. Used for CO2 calculation, eventually for survival rate of virus
Relative Humidity	50 %	Not yet used, but may eventually be used for survival rate of virus
Background CO2 Outdoors	415 ppm	See readme
Duration of event	50 min	Value for your situation of interest
Number of repetitions of event	180 times	For e.g. multiple class meetings, multiple commutes in public transportation etc.
Ventilation w/ outside air	3 h-1	Value in h-1. Readme : Same as "air changes per hour". Value in L/s per to compare to guidelines (e.g. ASHRAE 62.1)
Decay rate of the virus	0.02 h-1	See Readme . can estimate for a given T, RH, UV from DHS estimator
Deposition to surfaces	0.3 h-1	Buonanno et al. (2020), Miller et al. (2020). Could vary 0.24-1.5 h-1, depending on particle size range
Additional control measures	0 h-1	E.g. filtering office air, HEPA air cleaner, UV disinfection, etc. See FAQs, Readme for calc for portable HEPA filter
Total first order loss rate	3.92 h-1	Sum of all the first-order rates
Ventilation rate per person	11.8 L/s/person	This is the value of ventilation that really matters for disease transmission. Includes additional control measures
Parameters related to people and activity in the room		
Total N people present	10	Value for your situation of interest
Infective people	1 person	Keep this at one unless you really want to study a different cases - see conditional and absolute results
Fraction of population immune	0%	From seroprevalence reports, will depend on each location and time, see Readme
Susceptible people	9 people	Value for your situation of interest
Density (area / person) in room	50 sq ft / person	
Density (people / area) in room	0.21 persons / m2	
Density (volume / person) in room	14.2 m3 / person	
Breathing rate (susceptibles)	0.52 m3 / h	See Readme sheet - varies a lot with activity level
CO2 emission rate (1 person)	0.005 L/s (@ 273 K and 1 atm)	From tables in Readme page. This does not affect infection calculation, only use of CO2 as indicator, could ignore
CO2 emission rate (all persons)	0.005 L/s (@ at actual P & T of room)	Previous, multiplied by number of people, and applying ideal gas law to convert to ambient P & T
Quanta exhalation rate (infected)	29 infectious doses (quanta) h-1	See Readme file. Depends strongly on activity, also like person. This is the most uncertain parameter; try different values
Exhalation mask efficiency	50%	0 if infective person is not wearing a mask. See Readme sheet
Fraction of people w/ masks	100%	Value for your situation. It is applied to everybody for both emission & inhalation. Modify formulas manually if needed
Inhalation mask efficiency	30%	See Readme sheet
Parameters related to the COVID-19 disease		
Probability of being infective	0.20%	Very important parameter; specific for each region and time period. For ABSOLUTE results (prob. given prevalence of disease in the population). See Readme sheet
Hospitalization rate	20%	From news reports. Varies strongly with age and risk factors
Death rate	1%	From news reports. Varies strongly with age and risk factors (1% typical - Higher for older / at risk people)
CONDITIONAL result for ONE EVENT: we assume the number of infected people above, and get the results under that assumption		
More appropriate to simulate known outbreaks (e.g. choir, restaurant etc.), and an worst-case scenario for regular events (if one is unlucky enough to have infective people in attendance of a given event)		

tinyurl.com/covid-estimator



Readme ▾ FAQs ▾ Master-Choir ▾ Class ▾ Subway ▾ Supermkt ▾ Stadium ▾

→ Extensive & interesting explanations

J. L Jimenez, Dept. of Chem. and CIRES, Univ. of Colorado-Boulder

2021-01-21

Calculator 3: REHVA

Federation of European Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Associations

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REHVA CALCULATOR

to estimate the effect of ventilation on COVID-19 airborne transmission

This calculator was developed by Prof. Jarek Kurnitski and the REHVA COVID-19 Task Force for specialists with at least a minimum understanding of ventilation and air distribution. The tool is available for download for experts who have read and understood the related COVID-19 guidance document, as well as the explanation on the use of the tool or are enrolled in the [REHVA COVID-19 course](#). To download the xls calculator, please fill in the form below and accept the terms and conditions.

Fill in form to download the calculator

rehva.eu/covid19-ventilation-calculator



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Environment International

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envint

Quantitative assessment of the risk of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 infection: Prospective and retrospective applications

G. Buonanno^{a,b}, L. Morawska^b, L. Stabile^{a,*}^a Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, University of Cassino and Southern Lazio, Cassino, FR, Italy^b International Laboratory for Air Quality and Health, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Qld, Australia

Exposure scenarios	AER (h ⁻¹)	Accepted maximum individual infection risk (R _{max})				
		1 × 10 ⁻¹	1 × 10 ⁻²	1 × 10 ⁻³	1 × 10 ⁻⁴	1 × 10 ⁻⁵
Scenario B – Gym	0.5	225	43	12	4	1
Emitting subject:	3.0	528	59	13	4	1
Exercising person	10.0	1440	132	17	4	1
Exposed subject:						
Exercising person						

Scenario B

Type of indoor environment	Gym
Emitting subject	Exercising person (heavy exercise, oral breathing; IR = 3.30 m ³ h ⁻¹)
Exposed subject	Exercising person (heavy exercise; IR = 3.30 m ³ h ⁻¹)
Volume (m ³)	300
Ventilation, AER (h ⁻¹)	
Deposition rate, <i>k</i> (h ⁻¹)	
Inactivation rate, <i>λ</i> (h ⁻¹)	

(ER_q). In these two cases, an individual risk of $< 10^{-3}$ would be not actually achievable by varying and optimizing the room ventilation (e.g. AER > 1000 h⁻¹ would be required), and is maybe achievable only by reducing the exposure time of the susceptible subjects and the quanta emission rates, and through advanced ventilation able to remove air exhaled by the infected subject before it is mixed with the room air.

decrease to 2.0 and 0.7 for auditorium and conference room, respectively, in the case of mechanical ventilation at 10 h⁻¹. The maximum number of subjects that could attend simultaneously the event in order to guarantee $R_0 \leq 1$ is 26 and 135 for AERs equal to 0.5 h⁻¹ and 10 h⁻¹, respectively. Thus, in the management of the epidemic, reducing the crowding index and exposure time could be essential. Accepting higher

BMJ qualitative score sheet

Type and level of group activity	Low occupancy				High occupancy		
	Outdoors and well ventilated	Indoors and well ventilated	Poorly ventilated		Outdoors and well ventilated	Indoors and well ventilated	Poorly ventilated
Wearing face coverings, contact for short time							
Silent	Low	Low	Low		Low	Low	Medium
Speaking	Low	Low	Low		Low	Low	Medium
Shouting, singing	Low	Low	Medium		Medium	Medium	High
Wearing face coverings, contact for prolonged time							
Silent	Low	Low	Medium		Low	Medium	High
Speaking	Low	*	Medium		*	Medium	High
Shouting, singing	Low	Medium	High		Medium	High	High
No face coverings, contact for short time							
Silent	Low	Low	Medium		Medium	Medium	High
Speaking	Low	Medium	Medium		Medium	High	High
Shouting, singing	Medium	Medium	High		High	High	High
No face coverings, contact for prolonged time							
Silent	Low	Medium	High		Medium	High	High
Speaking	Medium	Medium	High		High	High	High
Shouting, singing	Medium	High	High		High	High	High
Risk of transmission							
Low Low Medium Medium High High * Borderline case that is highly dependent on quantitative definitions of distancing, number of individuals, and time of exposure							

* Borderline case that is highly dependent on quantitative definitions of distancing, number of individuals, and time of exposure

¹ Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University of Oxford, UK

² St Thomas' Hospital, London, UK

³ Somerville College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

⁴ St John's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

⁵ Fluid Dynamics of Disease Transmission Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

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Cite this as: *BMJ* 2020;370:m3223

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m3223>

Published: 25 August 2020

Two metres or one: what is the evidence for physical distancing in covid-19?

Rigid safe distancing rules are an oversimplification based on outdated science and experiences of past viruses, argue **Nicholas R Jones and colleagues**

Nicholas R Jones, Zeshan U Qureshi, ²Robert J Temple, ³Jessica P J Larwood, ⁴Trisha Greenhalgh, ¹Lydia Bourouiba⁵


Physical distancing is an important part of measures to control covid-19, but exactly how far away and for how long contact is safe in different contexts is unclear. Rules that stipulate a single specific physical distance (1 or 2 metres) between individuals to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus causing covid-19, are based on an outdated, dichotomous notion of respiratory droplet size. This overlooks the physics of respiratory emissions, where droplets of

normality in some aspects of social and economic life.

Origins of 2 metre rule

The study of how droplets are emitted during speech or more forcefully when coughing or sneezing began in the 19th century, with scientists typically collecting samples on glass or agar plates.³ In 1897, for example, Flügge proposed a 1-2 m safe distance based on the

“Air Changes per Hour” (ACH)



- Mixing
 - 1 ACH = 63 % renewed in 1 hour
 - 6 ACH = 99 % renewed in 1 hour
- Examples
 - House windows closed : ~ 0,5 ACH
 - Hospital : 6-12 ACH
 - Birnir (2020) / Buonanno : in Ghinzou restaurant **60-1000 ACH** would have be required

Properties of the infectious Person

Speaking volume [1=quietly, 3=loud, 4..9= singing/screaming]

mask efficiency (exhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.7, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.5]

fraction of speaking [0-100%]

respiratory rate [l/min] [7.5-15; adult=10]

Room Properties

air exchange rate [1/h] [0.35=no ventilation, 2=rapid ventilation once per h, 6=public places/supermarket]

floor size [m²]

height [m]

Event details

duration [h]

mask efficiency (inhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.5, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.2]

People in Room

> Aerosol Properties (for experts)

Virus Properties (for experts)

Dosis at 50% infection prob [100-1000]

RNA conc in liquid [copies/ml] [1e8-1e11]

The reported viral RNA concentration of approximately 5×10^8 /ml represents the category of highly infectious patients and represents approximately 20% of individuals tested positive for SARS-CoV-2

lifetime in air [h]

9.1% individual infection risk if one person is infectious
89% probability that at least one other person gets infected at the event.

Properties of the infectious Person

Speaking volume [1=quietly, 3=loud, 4..9= singing/screaming]

mask efficiency (exhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.7, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.5]

fraction of speaking [0-100%]

respiratory rate [l/min] [7.5-15; adult=10]

Room Properties

air exchange rate [1/h] [0.35=no ventilation, 2=rapid ventilation once per h, 6=public places/supermarket]

floor size [m²]

height [m]

Event details

duration [h]

mask efficiency (inhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.5, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.2]

People in Room

> Aerosol Properties (for experts)

Virus Properties (for experts)

Dosis at 50% infection prob [100-1000]

RNA conc in liquid [copies/ml] [1e8-1e11]

The reported viral RNA concentration of approximately 5×10^8 /ml represents the category of highly infectious patients and represents approximately 20% of individuals tested positive for SARS-CoV-2

lifetime in air [h]

1.9% individual infection risk if one person is infectious
36% probability that at least one other person gets infected at the event.

Properties of the infectious Person

Speaking volume [1=quietly, 3=loud, 4..9= singing/screaming]

mask efficiency (exhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.7, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.5]

fraction of speaking [0-100%]

respiratory rate [l/min] [7.5-15; adult=10]

Room Properties

air exchange rate [1/h] [0.35=no ventilation, 2=rapid ventilation once per h, 6=public places/supermarket]

floor size [m²]

height [m]

Event details

duration [h]

mask efficiency (inhale) [0-1; surgical mask ~0.5, everyday mask (2 fabric layers) ~0.2]

People in Room

> Aerosol Properties (for experts)

Virus Properties (for experts)

Dosis at 50% infection prob [100-1000]


RNA conc in liquid [copies/ml] [1e8-1e11]

The reported viral RNA concentration of approximately 5×10^8 /ml represents the category of highly infectious patients and represents approximately 20% of individuals tested positive for SARS-CoV-2

lifetime in air [h]

3.3% individual infection risk if one person is infectious
53% probability that at least one other person gets infected at the event.

How to obtain the ACH ?



Too much CO_2 = not enough airing

CO₂ : how much is too much ?



1 ppm
= 1 particle per million
= 1 µL/L

max. 900 ppm CO₂ during 95 % of the time
or min. 40 m³ / hour / pers during 95 % of the time

AR-KB 2/5/2019


CO₂ - Some results

a supermarket
in Jette



	ppm	Air changes per hour	m ³ /pers/h
Supermarket (Jette)	1150	0,7	31,5
Bookshop (Brussels)	1200	0,9	27

Cabinet 1 - 4/1



Classroom



Quick airing assessement in steady state

“What risk is associated with this CO₂ value?”

1. Measure CO₂
2. $ACH = \frac{N_{\text{pers}} \cdot S_0}{V \cdot (CO_2 - C_{\text{out}})} \cdot 1000$
3. Determine the risk level

“What CO₂ value is allowed for this risk level?”

1. Set the risk level
2. Determine the ACH
3. $CO_2 = C_{\text{out}} + \frac{N_{\text{pers}} \cdot S_0}{ACH \cdot V} \cdot 1000$


V = volume of the room in m³ (max ~300)

S_0 ~ 20 l/h (breathing rate, for adults)

C_{out} ~ 430 ppm

REHVA rule of thumb (offices, when people are present, at equilibrium)

$$Q_e = N_{\text{pers}} \cdot S_0 / (C_{\text{in}} - C_{\text{out}})$$



Hospital : 6-12 ACH
 TGV : 6 ACH
 Superspreading (eg choir/restaurant : vent. rate < 1-2 L/s/pers)

14 L / (s pers)
 51 m³ / (h pers)

20 L / (s pers)
 72 m³ / (h pers)

40 L / (s pers)
 144 m³ / (h pers)

Assess airing – more precise method

SCHOOLS

FOR HEALTH

How School Buildings Influence
Student Health, Thinking and
Performance



HARVARD T.H. CHAN
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH



5-step guide to checking ventilation rates in classrooms



Joseph Allen, Jack Spengler, Emily Jones, Jose Cedeno-Laurent
Harvard Healthy Buildings program | www.ForHealth.org

August, 2020

Measuring the ACH

« dry ice »
or after the occupation of the building

- using CO₂
- measure baseline + scenarios (eg : 1 window open, transversal flow, ...)
- ⚠ outside wind conditions



Practically...



THE 6 GOLDEN RULES OF THE PHASE-OUT PLAN



Observe the hygiene measures all day long.



Outdoor activities should be preferred.



Look out for at-risk groups and/or vulnerable people.



Maintain a safe distance (1.5m), except when around people living under the same roof, your close contacts and children under the age of 12. If distancing is not possible, wear a mask.



Limit your close contacts to no more than 10 persons a week.



Groups of no more than 10 people can meet each other at home or outdoors.

EXIT STRATEGY



Correspondence

How can airborne transmission of COVID-19 indoors be minimised?



« Masks, ventilation, ... »

How much ? -> Use the calculators & sensors

Monitor airing using CO₂ sensors

- Low-cost OK (NDIR technology - ~200 €) – cf literature
- Eg: ARANET 4 (cited by REHVA), Yoctopuce, Renison, Laagom, ...
- Belgium: Airsain
- Characteristics
 - Depend on your goal
 - Measure for yourself/to motivate your small team
 - Monitor your company, your city
 - Control & enforcement
 - Connectivity : none, GSM, LORA, ...
 - Calibration
 - Maintenance
 - Traffic lights, beeps – configurable or not


(Demo)



Increase airing

“Specific airflow patterns, and not just average ventilation and air changes, within buildings are also important in determining risk of exposure and transmission.” BMJ

- 2 windows better than 1
- Mechanical ventilation with outside air
- Transverse flow but ! flows from person to person
- Low velocity
- May need an architect in complex situations
- ! Comfort, otherwise people close the window forever
- A sensor may help to motivate



Supplement airing

(Portable) HEPA filters work above & below 300 nm



Mechanical filtration only

A HEPA filter adds **air changes per hour (ACH)**

Extensively used in hospitals

Min **H13** (norm EN 1822-1)

Must be **properly dimensioned, operated & maintained**

UVC inside the machine cannot hurt

! Noise, otherwise people will shut it down forever


Does not remove CO₂

Calculator:

trox.be/fr/le-purificateur-dair-trox-603b7b4c4b6c1659

Harvard calculator:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1zirxflfaDyiyXn9teMkt0kZfDAeu1dwC24bOWg6yl_M/edit#gid=1882881703



Do not use fancy air-purifiers




« catalysis, photocatalysis, plasma, ozonation, active coal... »

« sometimes incomplete degradation of the pollutants [...] forming potentially dangerous chemical compounds »

inrs.fr/header/presse/cp-dispositifs-anti-covid.html

Countermeasures for an event?



REHVA & ATIC.be, adapted from CDC



- 1. Reduce the probability an infected person is present at the event
 - Communication
 - Rapid testing ? Cf Barcelona
 - ...
- 2. Prevent contacts between bubbles
 - End2end traffic & crowd management
- 3. Aerosol risk analysis =>
 - Outdoor if possible
 - Adequate density, masks, timing, ...
 - Airing / HEPA well dimensioned
 - Air extraction from singer/speaker/... => no mixing with the room
 - ...
- Administrative
 - Certification à la Vincotte (like for the electricity, ...)
- 5. Be ready
 - Monitor airing in real time
 - Mandatory testing after the event, included in the ticket price?
 - Could even be pooled
 - Lightning fast contact tracing

[see also opsman.eu/fr/services/support-evenementiel/rapport-covid-19-0](https://opsman.eu/fr/services/support-evenementiel/rapport-covid-19-0)

Next steps

- You want your employees to **air more**
 - Buy a CO₂ sensor (200 €)
 - Participatory / Beep / Control
- You want to quickly **assess the risk & airing** in your facilities
 - Use & understand the risk calculators
 - Buy a bunch of CO₂ sensors + fans & follow the Harvard guide
 - Try to strive for min 4 ACH
- You **cannot air more**
 - Properly install (true) HEPA-filters



+ max 900 ppm





Figure 8. CO₂ concentration absolute values that include outdoor concentration depending on ventilation rate and occupancy in offices.



More broadly

Do research

- Ask epidemiologists for a **probability threshold** so that the R stays below 1
- For each practical setting, relate it to the amount of airing
- Prospective research to relate infection & bad airing in practical settings
- Assess the efficiency-curves of portable HEPA filters using lab experiments & in practical settings

Involve the community

- Effective sensibilisation campaign
- Go preventively with CO₂ sensors in risky spaces (eg: prayer-rooms, chicha-bars, ...), **even clandestine ones** (risk reduction approach, as for drugs)
- Build momentum, diffuse the knowledge, have citizens measure at home & report (“citizen science”)

Norms & certifications

- Inform & train the professionals associations (event industry, HORECA, ...) + audits
- Certification (Vinçotte, OCB, ...)



Monitor

- Assess the airing in real time (voluntarily / displayed / remote-monitored)

Audits

- Results of the measurements for several airing scenarios per room + a 24 hours measurement
- ACH estimations
- Simulations for several risk scenarios per room
- Recommendations

Risk Scenarios



Using the risk-models, for different scenarios

- Considering the speaker/singer/... is infected
- Considering someone in the audience is infected
- Normal-spreader (20%)
- Super-spreader (5 %)
- Several residence time
- Several airing scenarios
- Use a safety coefficient
- If volume > 300 m³, consider several the worst case of several independant 300 m³ volumes

Compare against risk & different norms

- Eg : conditional indiv risk threshold < 1 % on the whole period
- Eg : HARVARD classroom > 5 ACH
- Ventilation Cat II
- < 900 ppm during > 95 % time

Report




Scen.	Ppm	ACH	m ³ /pers/h
A	980	3	20
B	730	6	50

Recommendations

- Amount of airing needed: ...
- Achieved by:
 - Windows/doors opening constant/... times per hour
 - Opposite flow
 - Indirect flow / velocity limit
 - External ventilation
 - AC with outside air
- HEPA Filtration
 - Of the whole volume
 - Targeted on the high risk emission/reception zone
 - No other physico-chemical !
- Correct wearing of masks
- Limiting exposure time
- Potentially
 - Max CO₂ before airing
 - One apparatus to motivate to open windows

More complex situations:


Computational Fluid Dynamics **simulations**
and/or **tracer smoke**



Yuguo Li et al
(2020)


To ensure:

- no stationary flows
- no direct flows on people
- low velocity



press.bmwgroup.com/belux/photo/detail/P90252892/30-03-2017-bmw-motorsport-computational-fluid-dynamics-cfd-simulation-bmw-m4-dtm

Aerosol countermeasures are only one tool



Some references

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- REHVA (nov 2020) *COVID-19 guidance, v 4.0 - How to operate HVAC and other building service systems to prevent the spread of the coronavirus disease in workplaces*
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- V. Vuorinen et al (2020) *Modelling aerosol transport and virus exposure with numerical simulations in relation to SARS-CoV-2 transmission by inhalation indoors*
- Y Li et al (2020), *Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 - Evidence for probable aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant*
- J.L. Jimenez (2020), *COVID-19 Aerosol Transmission Estimator*, <https://tinyurl.com/covid-estimator>, accessed 4-Jan-2021
- B. Birnir (2020) *The Build-Up of Aerosols Carrying the SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus, in Poorly Ventilated, Confined Spaces*